Nós, seres humanos, somos a única espécie viva da face da terra que literalmente somos submetidos a um processo de instrução formal. E dentro desta amplo processo de formação cultural que experienciamos intensamente ao longo da nossa trajetória existencial - desenhada por meio dos traços intersubjetivos que estabelecemos com as instituições educacionais que contribuíram efetivamente para que nos tornássemos aquilo que somos do ponto de vista intelectual, afetivo, moral e profissional - arrisco a dizer que, todos nós, de algum modo, (...) guardamos no reinado da memória a lembrança potente e afetuosa de um educador ou educadora que marcou de maneira significativa a nossa vida. (shrink)

This paper proposes and analyzes the psychometric properties of the PREVI-A scale. It describes the process of item development, the factorial structure of the scale, reliability, evidence of validity and diagnostic performance with regard to recidivism risk in juvenile offenders. The sample was made up of 212 juvenile offenders held at detention centers run by the Madrid Agency for Reeducation and Reintegration of Juvenile Offenders, a regional government body. Statistical analyses were used to corroborate the theoretical factorial structure of the (...) PREVI-A, which consists of six risk/protection dimensions based on the Risk-Needs-Responsivity Model, and to obtain empirical support for the reliability and validity of PREVI-A as a tool to assess the risk of recidivism by juvenile offenders in Spain. (shrink)

In the evolution of criminally relevant action in modern crime theory, social action has assumed a particular significance as a dogmatic element that enables the effective protection of legal assets in a society beset by risks. In the vast array of theories regarding the role of the guarantor and its legal and doctrinal development, as well as the jurisprudential extension of equivalence clauses of improper omissions that serve as amplifier devices of the criminal statue through an indirect adaptation, there is (...) a need to identify the most effective means to shield legal assets, which allows for an imputation of passive conducts, despite having an active typical description. This introduces the controversial figure of the improper omission, which is used with the function of perfecting all of the structural elements of the criminal conduct. When an individual knows he is in a position of guarantor and is aware of the potential consequences, but fails to take action, having the means to prevent a foreseeable outcome, this device serves to enhance the criminal protection of legal assets, fostering social solidarity as the basis of the criminal justice system. This system, by satisfying the function of general prevention of the punishment, ideally dissuades the individual from committing crimes with the threat of penalty. These theories are fundamental to understanding criminal responsibility by improper omission in the context of the objective imputation theory. By guiding the evolution and delimitation of its application, they serve as a significant factor in criminal social control in Colombia. (shrink)

Tres filósofos catalanes: Joaquín Xirau. Eduardo Nicol. José Ferrater Mora.--La herencia de Ortega y Gasset: José Gaos. Luis Recaséns Siches. Manuel Granell. Francisco Ayala. María Zambrano.--Dos filósofos independientes: Juan D. García Bacca. Eugenio Imaz.--Panorama general de la filosofía española en América.

El contenido del libro lo integran trabajos presentados por algunos de los más importantes filósofos anglosajones del derecho penal, todos ellos profesores en aquel momento en el Reino Unido. Dichos trabajos fueron discutidos por penalistas, filósofos y criminólogos de habla hispana provenientes de España, Argentina y Chile. En este sentido, el workshop ejemplificó también el tipo de acercamiento que los distintos mundos académicos, en este caso el mundo anglosajón y el hispano, o de forma más general el mundo jurídico del (...) common law y el de la tradición europea continental, están viviendo en estos días. (shrink)

The central aim of this paper is to explain how protocol sentences establish a specific space for scientific discussion at the level of observation in the social sciences. In this space, the four levels of the theory of protocol sentences work as a coordinate system that allows to specify the degree of quality of data production. To do so, we elaborate upon Jean-Claude Passeron’s epistemology by combining it with Otto Neurath’s theory of protocol sentences. We start by discussing Passeron’s interpretation (...) of Neurath’s work in Le raissonnement sociologique and then present Neurath’s theory, following Thomas Uebel’s interpretation, with the purpose of developing the potential of Passeron’s epistemology in this regard. (shrink)

Este artículo examina la posibilidad de abordar la cuestión aristotélica de la “vida buena” o la felicidad desde el marco de una teoría ética postkantiana: la ética del discurso. Se intenta mostrar que la ética contemporánea sólo admite una concepción subjetivista de la “vida buena”, incompatible con un tratamiento racional como el que pretendía darle Aristóteles. A continuación se argumenta que la cuestión de la “vida buena” puede seguir siendo importante para la ética contemporánea si se reconstruye en los términos (...) de una teoría de las condiciones formales que debe cumplir una determinación autónoma de la vida buena, es decir: una determinación no distorsionada por el autoengaño o la falsa conciencia. Sin embargo, finalmente se mostrará que el enfoque aristotélico no puede ser hoy muy relevante para elaborar dicha teoría. En cambio es preferible para la ética contemporánea recurrir a la teoría psicológica o la teoría de la sociedad. (shrink)

This paper approaches the discussion that took place during the second half of the Twentieth Century about the biological significance of the cryptobiotic state. Cryptobiosis has been defined as an evolutionary strategy in which organisms overcome adverse environmental conditions by entering a latency mode considered the third state between life and death. It is a poorly known phenomenon where metabolism, growth, reproduction and senescence are greatly reduced or cease temporarily. Since metabolism is conceived as a defining feature of life, it (...) is argued that Cryptobiosis is a kind of temporal death, because metabolic activity sometimes seems to have stopped completely during the cryptobiotic state. In the following pages we deal with the cryptobiotic phase -as understood in the second half of the last Century-, considering two basic references: a case study, the case of group Tardigrada -small animals between a tenth of a millimeter and one millimeter that can survive in extreme conditions entering different states of latency-; and, secondly, the model around Cryptobiosis as recursive hierarchical metabolism proposed by Yair Neuman. (shrink)

The author challenges the view that birth cannot be a morally relevant fact in the process of development from zygote to child. He reviews specific arguments against giving any moral significance to the fact of birth. Drawing on recent work in developmental psychology, he contends that the lives of neonates can have a level of self-consciousness that confers moral significance but can only be possessed after birth. He shows that the position he has argued for provides a framework within which (...) the move from the moral validity of aborting sentient fetuses to the moral validity of infanticide might be resisted. He concludes that arguments suggesting that birth can be morally significant support the view that the acquisition of moral significance is a gradual and multilayered phenomenon. (shrink)

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

Forms of thinking that involve thinking about thought are only available to creatures participating in a public language. Thoughts can only be the objects of further thoughts if they have suitable vehicle and the only suitable vehicle is public language sentences. These language-dependent cognitive abilities range from second-order reflection on one's own beliefs and desires and the capacity to attribute thoughts to others to the ability to entertain tensed thoughts and to deploy logical concepts. Many of these language-dependent cognitive abilities, (...) however, have primitive analogues that do not involve intentional ascent and hence are available at the nonlinguistic level. This chapter considers the practical implications this has for the scope and limits of nonlinguistic thought. The chapter explores the question: what types of thinking are in principle unavailable to nonlinguistic creatures? There are two types of intentional ascent, which might be termed explicit and implicit intentional ascent respectively. (shrink)

It is now 25 years since Gareth Evans introduced the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content in The Varieties of Reference. This is a fitting time to take stock of what has become a complex and extended debate both within philosophy and at the interface between philosophy and psychology. Unfortunately, the debate has become increasingly murky as it has become increasingly ramified. Much of the contemporary discussion does not do full justice to the powerful theoretical tool originally proposed by Evans (...) and subsequently refined by theorists in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s – most effectively, I think, by Christopher Peacocke (particularly in his 1992). Even worse, significant parts of the discussion are somewhat confused. This paper makes a start on clarifying what I think ought to be the central issues in debates about nonconceptual content. I begin in §1 by pointing out how narrowly focused contemporary discussion is relative to Evans’s original discussion. We are not making as much use as we should of nonconceptual content as a tool for understanding subpersonal information processing and the complexities of its status relative to perception and thought at the personal level. In §2 I turn to what is the central focus of contemporary discussion, namely, the content of perception and identify a “master argument” for nonconceptualism based on the relation between conceptual capacities and capacities for perceptual discrimination. The aim of §3 is to clarify the relation between the claim that perception has nonconceptual content and some superficially similar claims discussed by philosophers of perception. Finally, in §4 I explain why the attention recently focused on what is sometimes called the state version of the nonconceptualist thesis seems to me to be misdirected. (shrink)

How precisely to understand and evaluate counterfactuals can be an intricate issue. The aim of this article is to examine a new set of difficulties for evaluating counterfactuals that arise in the context of the dynamical spacetimes described by the theory of general relativity (GR). The initial value formulation provides us with a methodology to pin down the specific combination of features of the theory at the origin of the difficulties, namely, non-linearity and certain non-local aspects (typically captured by ellipticity (...) at the analytical level), in particular when combined with the global and/or quasi-local character of physical quantities in GR. Finally, we connect the philosophical question about counterfactuals with concrete applied physical issues in GR about extracting meaningful predictions by constructing appropriate initial data sets, leading us to question the very suitability of the Cauchy approach to fully account for the explanatory power of the theory. (shrink)

"The book presents in accessible fashion recent important work on the self and self-consciousness and also moves the issues forward with interesting new ideas. It provides a notably crisp and clear treatment of some extremely intriguing topics." -- Jane Heal, Department of Philosophy, University of Cambridge In this book, José Luis Bermú dez addesses two fundamental problems in the philosophy and psychology of self-consciousness: (1) Can we provide a noncircular account of fully fledged self-conscious thought and language in (...) terms of more fundamental capacities? (2) Can we explain how fully fledged self-conscious thought and language can arise in the normal course of human development? Bermú dez argues that a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) arises from the apparent strict interdependence between self-conscious thought and linguistic self-reference. The paradox renders circular all theories that define self-consciousness in terms of linguistic mastery of the first-person pronoun. It seems to follow from the paradox of self-consciousness that no such account or explanation can be given. Drawing on recent work in empirical psychology and philosophy, the author argues that any explanation of fully fledged self-consciousness that answers these two questions requires attention to primitive forms of self-consciousness that are prelinguistic and preconceptual. Such primitive forms of self-consciousness are to be found in somatic proprioception, the structure of exteroceptive perception, and prelinguistic forms of social interaction. The author uses these primitive forms of self-consciousness to dissolve the paradox ofself-consciousness and to show how the two questions can be given an affirmative answer. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is social understanding. By this I mean the cognitive skills underlying social behaviour and social coordination. Normal, encultured, non-autistic and non-brain-damaged human beings are capable of an impressive degree of social coordination. We navigate the social world with a level of skill and dexterity fully comparable to that which we manifest in navigating the physical world. In neither sphere, one might think, would it be a trivial matter to identify the various competences which underly this (...) impressive level of performance. Nonetheless, at least as far as interpersonal interactions are concerned, philosophers show a rare degree of unanimity. What grounds our success in these interactions is supposed to be our common mastery of folk psychology. (shrink)

Regulatory science, which generates knowledge relevant for regulatory decision?making, is different from standard academic science in that it is oriented mainly towards the attainment of non?epistemic (practical) aims. The role of uncertainty and the limits to the relevance of academic science are being recognized more and more explicitly in regulatory decision?making. This has led to the introduction of regulation?specific scientific methodologies in order to generate decision?relevant data. However, recent practical experience with such non?standard methodologies indicates that they, too, may be (...) subject to important limitations. We argue that the attainment of non?epistemic values and aims (like the protection of human health and the environment) requires not only control of the quality of the data and the methodologies, but also the selection of the level of regulation deemed adequate in each specific case (including a decision about which of the two, under?regulation or over?regulation, would be more acceptable). (shrink)

Thinking Without Words provides a challenging new theory of the nature of non-linguistic thought. Jose Luis Bermudez offers a conceptual framework for treating human infants and non-human animals as genuine thinkers. The book is written with an interdisciplinary readership in mind and will appeal to philosophers, psychologists, and students of animal behavior.

In this paper we expand previous results obtained in [2] about the study of categorical equivalence between the category IRL 0 of integral residuated lattices with bottom, which generalize MV-algebras and a category whose objects are called c-differential residuated lattices. The equivalence is given by a functor ${{\mathsf{K}^\bullet}}$ , motivated by an old construction due to J. Kalman, which was studied by Cignoli in [3] in the context of Heyting and Nelson algebras. These results are then specialized to the case (...) of MV-algebras and the corresponding category ${MV^{\bullet}}$ of monadic MV-algebras induced by “Kalman’s functor” ${\mathsf{K}^\bullet}$ . Moreover, we extend the construction to ℓ-groups introducing the new category of monadic ℓ-groups together with a functor ${\Gamma ^\sharp}$ , that is “parallel” to the well known functor ${\Gamma}$ between ℓ and MV-algebras. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to identify the elements that can be implemented to achieve an ethical infrastructure, in small and medium enterprises. The ethical infrastructure is considered as a set of formal and informal systems, leadership, climate and culture, related to ethical issues. The research was carried out through interviews and focus groups with managers from 28 companies in Madrid, all signatories to the Global Compact. The identified key elements in SMEs are leadership, informal managerial and formal communication. (...) This study also explores different factors that influence the effectiveness, implementation, and sustainability of the ethical infrastructure in SMEs, discovering some factors that can act as both accelerators and barriers such as pressure from customers. Additional findings regarding the concepts of ethics and corporate social responsibility in SMEs, dilemmas and characteristics of the culture and climate are also presented. (shrink)

The relationship between social and financial performance (CSP – FP) has been a main objective in the literature on business management, as it would provide an economic justification for the social investment insofar as it contributes to the creation of value. This relationship has been empirically tested by several authors though without using a theoretical model that sustains this relationship. The aim of this article is to propose a theoretical model of the process of the creation of value from the (...) reputation generated by companies, integrating the factors that have been shown to be more relevant in this process from previous research, in such a way that hypotheses are put forward regarding the existence of this relationship and the factors that determine it. Finally, an empirical test is performed using the 100 most prestigious companies operating in Spain during 2004. (shrink)

In their recent book The Inessential Indexical Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever take issue with what has become close to philosophical orthodoxy – the view, most often associated with John Perry and David Lewis, that psychological explanations are essentially indexical. Cappelen and Dever claim that claims of essential indexicality are typically driven by intuitions rather than supported by arguments. They issue a challenge to supporters of essential indexicality: Produce an argument to back up the intuitions. This paper answers their challenge.

El artículo afronta un tema novedoso que ha tenido recientemente tratamientos muy diversos. Algunosde sus objetivos podrían ser los siguientes: pretende señalar algunos caminos realizados en el diálogo entreciencia y técnica a lo largo de las últimas décadas y describir sucintamente los hitos que han conducido desde la ciencia clásica (newtoniana) a la tecnociencia actual. En el fondo, ofrecer también unas pinceladas sobre la nueva filosofía de la técnica, que se construye apartando viejos prejuicios humanistas, que cuenta con el desarrollo (...) teórico de la consiliencia y que no quiere estar dirigida ni principalmente ni exclusivamente hacia la ingeniería. En definitiva, una filosofía de la técnica con nueva ‘agenda’. El trabajo tiene cuatro grandes bloques: en el primero se describe el proyecto de la tecnociencia en su perspectiva histórica. En un segundo momento se pretende situar la técnica en la historia de las ciencias y de las técnicas. La tercera parte aborda la posibilidad (también necesidad) de una nueva visión de estos temas, que se ha dado en llamar visión sapiencial y transdisciplinar. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte, se señalan algunos pasos que se están dando en el campo de la filosofía de la técnica bajo esta nueva mirada, lo que podrían ser consideradas como las conclusiones, la nueva agenda: irrupción de enfoques éticos (entre otros, el de la responsabilidad) y nuevas visiones de ciencia-tecnología-sociedad. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for a naturalistic solution to some of the methodological controversies in regulatory science, on the basis of two case studies: toxicology and health claim regulation. We analyze the debates related to the scientific evidence that is considered necessary for regulatory decision making in each of those two fields, with a particular attention to the interactions between scientific and regulatory aspects. This analysis allows us to identify two general stances in the debate: a) one that argues (...) for more permissive standards of evidence and for methodological pluralism, and b) an opposing one that not only defends strict evidence requirements but also stipulates the use of one particular scientific methodologies for data generation. We argue that the real-world outcomes produced by alternative regulatory options are a vital piece of information that allows for the empirical assessment of these two stances. In particular, this information on outcomes makes it possible to analyze which standards of evidence and scientific methods generate the most useful knowledge as input for regulatory decision making. Our conclusion is that instead of an a priori selection of methodologies and standards, such decisions ought to be based on empirical evidence related to real-world outcomes. (shrink)

Galen Strawson's keynote paper offers us one way of modelling the self, one that starts from the phenomenology of the sense of self and derives from that metaphysical conclusions about the nature of the self. Strawson is surely correct to hold that phenomenological considerations cannot be ignored in thinking about the metaphysics of the self. I am not as convinced as he is, however, that phenomenology is the royal road to metaphysics. What I want to sketch out in this short (...) paper is another approach to the metaphysics of the self, one that is driven by reductivist concerns. As far as I can see it is an open question whether there are any global points of disagreement between us. (shrink)

Decision Theory and Rationality offers a challenging new interpretation of a key theoretical tool in the human and social sciences. This accessible book argues, contrary to orthodoxy in politics, economics, and management science, that decision theory cannot provide a theory of rationality.

Beyond different starting points, stakeholder theory and Catholic Social Thought share many compatible perspectives when analyzing the role of the firm in economic activity, especially regarding the attention of the firm to different social and economic actors. Additionally, ST bears limitations regarding its ethical and anthropological foundation, and also about the legitimation of the different stakeholders’ interests. Therefore, ST lacks clear criteria to solve possible conflicts of interest between stakeholders. This paper analyzes the potentiality of ST, widely accepted in corporate (...) management, to integrate CST principles in order to solve those conflicts. At the same time, the paper studies the possibility of finding in the principles of CST an anthropological and ethical foundation for ST. This foundation could be the source of criteria to discuss the levels of legitimation and prioritization between stakeholders´ interests, especially when those interests collide. (shrink)

Penn et al. propose the relational reinterpretation hypothesis as an explanation of the profound discontinuities that they identify between human and nonhuman cognition. This hypothesis is not a genuine replacement for the explanations that they reject, however, because as it stands, it simply redescribes the phenomena it is trying to explain.

This paper considers how best an eliminativist might argue for the radical falsity of commonsense psychology. I will be arguing that Paul Churchland’s “official” arguments for eliminative materialism (in, e.g., Churchland 1981) are unsatisfactory, although much of the paper will be developing themes that are clearly present in Churchland’s writings. The eliminativist needs to argue that the representations that feed into action are fundamentally different from those invoked by propositional attitude psychology. The “springs of action” are representations of features that (...) are much more finely grained than those encoded within the vocabulary that we employ to specify the content of propositional attitudes. The eliminativist’s most promising strategy is to argue that, whatever we might think about why we behave the way we do, careful experimental work will show that we are in fact acting in virtue of representations of properties and microfeatures that fall completely outside the ambit of propositional attitude psychology. The paper considers a number of examples of how this eliminativist strategy might be developed, ranging from the implications of the two visual systems hypothesis to research in social psychology into the role that situational factors play in controlling action. (shrink)

Frames and framing make one dimension of a decision problem particularly salient. In the simplest case, framesprimeresponses (as in, e.g., the Asian disease paradigm, where the gain frame primes risk-aversion and the loss frame primes risk-seeking). But in more complicated situations frames can function reflectively, by making salient particular reason-giving aspects of a thing, outcome, or action. For Shakespeare's Macbeth, for example, his feudal commitments are salient in one frame, while downplayed in another in favor of his personal ambition. The (...) role of frames in reasoning can give rise torational framing effects. Macbeth can prefer fulfilling his feudal duty to murdering the king, while also preferring bravely taking the throne to fulfilling his feudal duty, knowing full well that bravely taking the throne just is murdering the king. Such patterns ofquasi-cyclicalpreferences can be correct and appropriate from the normative perspective of how one ought to reason. The paper explores three less dramatic types of rational framing effects: (1) Consciously framing and reframing long-term goals and short-term temptations can be important tools for self-control. (2) In the prototypical social interactions modeled by game theory, allowing for rational framing effects solves longstanding problems, such as the equilibrium selection problem and explaining the appeal of non-equilibrium solutions (e.g., the cooperative solution in the Prisoner's Dilemma). (3) Processes for resolving interpersonal conflicts and breaking discursive deadlock, because they involve internalizing multiple and incompatible ways of framing actions and outcomes, in effect create rational framing effects. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo analiza las aportaciones de Ortega a la sociología de la filosofía. Se comienza explicando las circunstancias históricas en las que escribió nuestro autor. Posteriormente se presentan sus innovaciones, poniéndolas en relación con problemas tratados por Althusser, Skinner, Collins o Bourdieu. Así se propone que Ortega produce innovaciones en la concepción de las carreras en filosofía, en cómo las ideas de articulan en contextos locales, en la visión de la temporalidad de la filosofía y en la visión (...) crítica de la escolástica.: This paper analyzes Ortega's contributions to the sociology of philosophy. It begins by explaining the historical circumstances in which our author wrote. Subsequently, his innovations are presented in relation to problems dealt with by Althusser, Skinner, Collins, or Bourdieu. Thus, it is proposed that Ortega produces innovations in the conception of careers in philosophy, in how ideas are articulated in local contexts, in the vision of the temporality of philosophy and in the critical vision of scholasticism. (shrink)

First person judgments that are immune to error through misidentifi cation (IEM) are fundamental to self-conscious thought. The IEM status of many such judgments can be understood in terms of the possession conditions of the concepts they involve. However, this approach cannot be extended to first person judgments based on autobiographical memory. Th e paper develops an account of why such judgments have the IEM property and how thinkers are able to exploit this fact in inference.

Reseña de la obra de Orden Jiménez, Rafael V., Humanismo Republicano Iberoamericano. Un debate. Ambrosio Velasco Gómez; José Luis Villacañas Berlanga, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2019, pp. 127.

En el presente artículo se examinan los métodos de enseñanza-aprendizaje en la carrera dearquitectura (que entrañan procesos creativos complejos), apelando a experiencias mediadasy autorreguladas mediante el uso de morfologías como los fractales, los sistemas iterados, lamodelización de patrones, el crecimiento, la fragmentación y la transformación diacrónica yescalar, según los niveles de complejidad procesal. Esto supone un marco abierto de asimilacióndesde los planos de expresión espacial, material, funcional, estético y de habitabilidad dentro de uncontinuo proyectual, regido por el principio de las (...) formas puras, dictado fundamentalmente por laarquitectura moderna. Esto determina un nuevo y constante encuentro con el objeto morfológicoarquitectónico, que admite varias soluciones, variaciones e incluso inflexiones del mismo problema, de acuerdo a requerimientos y condiciones similares o cambiantes. Por todo lo anterior, se derivacomo objetivo, revisar, inicialmente, lo que debemos entender como complejidad, para luego definirciertos principios y niveles procedimentales, que actúan como meta-modelos, que se derivan delllamado Pensamiento Complejo, así como del Modelo MOSIG, y del diseño paramétrico actual enrelación con la enseñanza, especialmente los procesos creativos. En una tercera parte, se debe ofrecerun material de referencia de algunas experiencias de enseñanza basadas en este tipo de modelo. (shrink)

Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their (...) satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all. (shrink)